Is This The Worst Ever Yet? by Linneman, Peter D.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Real Estate Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2009
Is This The Worst Ever Yet?
Peter D. Linneman
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers
Part of the Real Estate Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/17
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Linneman, P. D. (2009). Is This The Worst Ever Yet?. Wharton Real Estate Review, 13 (1), 58-73. Retrieved from
http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/17
Is This The Worst Ever Yet?
Abstract
In this publication's last issue, John Williams and the author determined that the 2008 recession was the "least
worst" of the recessions of the past forty years. Now, the author says, we are in the second-worst recessionary
period of the last forty years, and it is worsening fast. But do not bet against the U.S. economy, he cautions.
Entrepreneurs are still out there, and with a modicum of political leadership and stable economic policy, we
will get through this stronger than ever. Realistically, we cannot save everyone, but in the Chapter 11 limbo,
companies can try to reconstitute themselves; "special" bailouts do nothing but redistribute income according
to political clout. Losers must lose if winners are to prosper. If one or more of the "Hopeless Three" (U.S. auto
manufacturers) goes bankrupt, their competitors' sales will rise; their operating margins will improve,
allowing them to avoid financial distress and expand output and employment domestically. As with
wildebeest in the Masai Mara, death is essential to life. People knew that leverage could be risky. Debt is
wonderful on the upside, but remorseless on the downside. This lesson will hopefully be remembered for a
new generation.
Disciplines
Real Estate
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I N T H E L A S T I S S U E of the
Wharton Real Estate Review, John
Williams and I examined how the 2008
recession compared to the six recessions
of the past forty years. We noted that—
as of that time—the current recession
was the “least worst” of the seven
episodes. An updated analysis indicates
that we are in the midst of the second-
worst recessionary period of the last
forty years, and it is worsening fast
(Tables I and II). But do not bet against
the U.S. economy. Entrepreneurs are
still out there, and with a modicum of
political leadership and stable econom-
ic policy, we will get through this
stronger than ever. However, it will take
Is This the
Worst Ever Yet?
A comparison of
historical recessions.
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Table I: “Worst ever” U.S. recessions over the past 40 years
Duration in Months 12 17 3 17 9 9 14
Change in GDP (%) -0.4% -3.5% -0.7% -2.7% -1.4% -0.2% 0.4%
Change in Payroll Employment (%) -1.2% -1.6% 0.2% -3.1% -1.1% -1.2% -1.9%
Change in Real Household Net Worth (%) 1.7% -10.1% -1.8% -1.4% -3.5% -3.4% -4.3%
Change in Auto Sales (%) -29.2% -30.4% -15.9% -12.5% -15.2% -6.2% -36.0%
Change in Industrial Output (%) -7.1% -15.0% -0.8% -8.5% -4.4% -4.0% -9.9%
Change in Real Sales by Retail Stores (%) -2.1% -9.5% -4.9% -5.1% -5.2% -1.3% -13.2%
Change in Construction Contracts for
C&I Builidings (%) -37.6% -52.2% -21.1% -41.3% -25.0% -33.6% -28.6%
Percent Real Return in S&P 500 -23.2% -39.9% -12.9% -23.2% -16.5% -11.3% -50.4%
Change in Real Median Home Price (%) -15.8% -4.0% -3.1% -8.7% -6.2% -1.1% -7.4%
Change in Real After Tax Profit (%) -13.3% -30.4% -12.7% -6.8% -12.3% -8.3% -4.3%
Lowest Consumer Confidence Level
(Monthly) 72.4 57.6 62.1 65.7 65.1 88.6 57.0
Change in Housing Starts -17.5% -30.5% -32.7% -25.1% -31.6% 2.1% -43.4%
Highest Inflation Rate (Monthly) 6.4% 12.2% 14.6% 11.0% 6.4% 3.6% 5.5%
Highest Unemployment Rate (Monthly) 5.8% 8.3% 6.3% 10.7% 6.8% 4.8% 7.2%
12/69- 11/73- 01/80 07/81- 07/90 03/01- 12/07
11/70 03/75 03/80 11/82 03/91 11/01 01/09
Table II: Ranking of U.S. recessions over the past 40 years
Duration in Months 4 6.5 1 6.5 2.5 2.5 5
Change in GDP (%) 3 7 4 6 5 2 1
Change in Payroll (%) 3.5 5 1 7 2 3.5 6
Change in Real Household Net Worth (%) 1 7 3 2 5 4 6
Change in Auto Sales (%) 5 6 4 2 3 1 7
Change in Industrial Output (%) 4 7 1 5 3 2 6
Change in Real Sales by Retail Stores (%) 2 6 3 4 5 1 7
Change in Construction Contracts for
C&I Builidings (%) 5 7 1 6 2 4 3
Percent Real Return in S&P 500 4.5 6 2 4.5 3 1 7
Change in Median Home Price (%) 7 3 2 6 4 1 5
Change in Real After Tax Profit (%) 6 7 5 2 4 3 1
Lowest Consumer Confidence Level (Monthly) 2 6 5 3 4 1 7
Change in Housing Starts 2 4 6 3 5 1 7
Highest Inflation Rate (Monthly) 3.5 6 7 5 3.5 1 2
Highest Unemployment Rate (Quarterly) 2 6 3 7 4 1 5
Total Rank Score 54.5 89.5 48 69 55 29 75
Number of Worsts 1 6 1 3 0 0 5
Number of Bests 1 0 4 0 0 8 2
12/69- 11/73- 01/80 07/81- 07/90 03/01- 12/07
11/70 03/75 03/80 11/82 03/91 11/01 12/08*
(Rank Order (7 is Worst; 1 is Best)
* 2008, Construction contracts, comparisons are through 2Q08.
2008 Median Home Price comparisons are through Oct. 2008.
2008 GDP, net wealth, A/T profit are through 3Q 2008.
2008 S&P Percent Real Return calculated at lowest reading on 11/20/08.
2008 payroll employment, auto sales, industrial output, and real retail sales are through Nov. 2008.
more time than we thought, due to the
needless panic that has been created by
our so-called political leadership.
The dotcom bubble gave rise to a
belief that fabulous riches could be
achieved by age thirty (thirty-five if you
are dumb) through financial models,
flip books and PowerPoint presenta-
tions. The goal became: fool “them” to
give you big money; cash out a short
time later; buy a sports franchise and
never work again. “Only chumps work
past thirty-five” became the prevalent
culture. But great business enterprises,
and the jobs and fortunes they create,
are the result of decades of hard work
and execution, not of fast, nifty finan-
cial models. Getting rich slowly is the
American way, and most overnight suc-
cesses prove to be fools’ gold.
Many of us bear blame for creating
the impression that flash presentations
and models, rather than grinding it out,
are the sure route to riches. Business
schools reinforced the idea that clever
ideas trump painstaking execution. And
faculty made it acceptable for students
to float by as long as they had good
financial modeling skills. But there is no
substitute for rolling up your sleeves
every day and working hard on the
details. This is true even if you are a
genius. We have all done capitalism a
great disservice by not saying that the
“get rich quick” emperor has no clothes.
W E C A L L E D I T — A L M O S T
In December 2005, I wrote that failed
political leadership, Fed policy errors, and
private-sector hubris would cause a reces-
sion in 2009. Did I foresee the magnitude
of the Great Capital Strike or the current
recession back then? Of course not. But I
knew that humans being human meant
that hubris would have its day. The last
time it was technology, while in the 1980s
it was commercial real estate, as well as Fed
policy errors fueling hubris in housing and
finance. And talk about hubris: financial
firms operating at 35:1 debt-to-equity
ratios apparently believed that they were
incapable of 3 percent errors (which would
have wiped out all their equity).
The serial disaster of the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) turned
what might have been a typical recession
into a very serious recession. After failing
to save Lehman from bankruptcy but
supporting AIG, and forcing several shot-
gun mergers, President George W. Bush,
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, presidential
candidates McCain and Obama, as well
as the leadership on both sides of the aisle
in both chambers of Congress, triggered
widespread panic when they announced
on September 24 that the world would
end if they did not enact legislation sav-
ing us. Overnight they managed to gen-
erate total panic on Main Street.
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On the morning of September 29, this
assembly of bipartisan leaders proudly
announced that they had drafted legisla-
tion that would save mankind—only to
watch as their handiwork was handily
defeated. No true political leader should
ever call for a critical vote without know-
ing that he or she actually has the votes. Yet
the entire political leadership of both par-
ties was clueless about the fate that await-
ed their proposed legislative salvation. The
magnitude of this political failure was
grasped by investors, who wrung their
hands with a 9.7 percent sell-off between
September 26 and September 29 S&P 500
close (Figure 1).
The farce did not end there. Four
days later, Congress easily passed the
same basic TARP proposal, supplement-
ed with loads of pork, including appro-
priations for a NASCAR race track and
tax breaks for a toy manufacturer of
wooden arrowheads. This political trav-
esty, combined with the abandonment of
economic policy for ad hoc decision
making, caused a run on banks and
money market funds, and a surge of
hedge and mutual fund redemptions.
Instead of clear and consistent policies,
the Bush Administration took on a trans-
parency and consistency worthy of
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Putin’s Russia, and
abandoned considered policy for ad hoc
“deals.” But when the rules of the eco-
nomic game disappear, so too do the peo-
ple willing to play that game. So it was not
a surprise that when economic rules
became idiosyncratic and unpredictable,
people rushed to cash and government
bonds. The “deal” approach of the past six
months will go down as one of the darkest
eras of U.S. economic policy, creating a far
deeper recession than was necessary.
The disaster continued. On October
14, Secretary Paulson (after appointing an
inexperienced thirty-five-year-old to head
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Figure 1: S&P 500 versus Morgan Stanley REIT Index, cumulative % change from Sept. 15, 2008
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TARP) announced that he would use
$250 billion of the $700 billion to inject
preferred equity in selected banks (no
description was offered of how they would
be selected)—after months of saying that
this was not the right path. Then on
November 12, he announced that he
would not purchase any troubled assets,
but would inject funds into banks and
other companies (such as auto makers).
This announcement was delivered with no
apology and no apparent concern for the
consequences of such a wildly changed
“policy.” Stocks fell another 5.2 percent
and volatility grew as policy evaporated
(Figure 2).
As governments around the world
stepped in to prop up their banks, global
stock markets plummeted, registering
their opinion of the long-term impact of
the global drift toward socialism and of ad
hoc “pragmatic decision making” rather
than a reliance on markets and consistent
economic policy.
B E W A R Y O F S A V I O R S
In the past few months, we have discov-
ered what it is like to live in a world where
economic success and failure hinges pri-
marily on government dictate rather than
on markets satisfying customers and com-
petition. As the U.S. Treasury made deals
to “save” the economy, the economy react-
ed like a patient with a penicillin allergy
who had been given penicillin. As the rules
of the economic game were replaced by
government fiat, people withdrew en
masse from the economic game.
Uncertainty is the deadly enemy of
efficient decision-making, and the gov-
ernment’s daily attempts to “save us”
ratcheted up the level of economic uncer-
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Figure 2: Volatility is off the charts
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange
tainty (Figure 3). As uncertainty skyrock-
eted, the economy collapsed. Faced with
government-created panic, common citi-
zens sought cash by runs on banks and
mutual funds, while sophisticated
investors sold everything they could to
move into government notes. Short-term
Treasury bill yields took a nosedive,
resulting in negative real returns (Figure
4). Just as the economic fabric is thin in
government-dictated economies such as
Russia, Zimbabwe and Venezuela, so too
the collapse of the rule of economic law
has crippled the U.S. economy.
This abrogation of rules was under-
scored by the lame-duck Treasury’s deci-
sion to bail out the Hopeless Three
automakers at unspecified terms, within
twenty-four hours after U.S. lawmakers
defeated a bailout bill (which was opposed
by 65 percent of Americans). This decision
made a mockery of the legislative process,
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Figure 3: Payout ratio vs. long-term shareholder returns
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Figure 4: Real short-term yields are negative
and was the nearest thing to a political
coup that we have witnessed in the United
States during our lifetime.
The economy will rebound from a
needlessly deep recession far more quickly
than most anticipate. This is particularly
true in view of the enormous decline in the
price of oil. Using the rule of thumb that
each $10 increment in oil price above $30
per barrel reduces GDP by roughly 30
basis points, the recent oil price decline
provides a 3 percent stimulus.
A major and widely overlooked cause
of the worldwide recession was the precip-
itous run-up in oil prices to $147 per bar-
rel (Figures 5 and 6). As rapidly elevated
oil prices worked through economies
around the world, the economic burden
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Source: U.S. Dept. of Energy
Figure 5: Crude oil prices are closer to the historical average
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became unbearable and global growth
plummeted from 4.5 percent to less than
2.5 percent.
U.S. auto sales declined roughly 30
percent from their peak in the third quar-
ter of 2005, while consumer real expendi-
tures on gasoline and related products fell
by 6 percent over the same period (Figures
7 and 8). In fact, monthly auto sales
declined by $18.1 billion when comparing
June 2007 to November 2008. Total
monthly retail sales declined by $18.6 bil-
lion during that time. As was the case dur-
ing the Weimar Republic, when people
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Figure 7: U.S. auto sales are dismal
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Figure 8: Consumer sentiment is the lowest in 40 years
Source: University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment; 1984=100
sought “salvation” in dubious political
leaders, these are dangerous times.The fact
that $700 billion in “salvation financing”
was hurriedly passed by Congress only to
become a blank check public welfare pro-
gram for the politically connected should
underscore our concern.
There are reasons why governments
around the world sold off much of their
nationalized interests over the past two
decades, including: scandals arising from
political lending, hiring and contracting at
nationalized firms; a lack of financial and
managerial innovation; a financial system
run with the plodding effectiveness of the
U.S. Postal System; the lack of responsive
customer service; ever-growing subsidies to
support inefficient financial entities; large
losses suffered on loan portfolios; politi-
cians retiring to well-paid cushy bank
directorships. It was a state-owned German
bank that was so asleep at the wheel that it
wired €300 million to Lehman minutes
before Lehman declared bankruptcy. Also,
recall the political corruption that charac-
terized state-owned banks in Mexico and
Italy. And let us not forget the horrid
underwriting record of state-owned
Chinese, French, and German banks.
Why was Bear Stearns saved but not
Lehman? Why were forced mergers
arranged for some institutions but not oth-
ers? Why was AIG saved? Why did TARP
initially focus on a buy-in of assets rather
than guarantees or equity infusions? Why
was TARP $700 billion rather than $600
or $800 billion? Why was Citibank
propped up while IndyMac andWachovia
were set adrift? Why was the buy-in plan
dropped in favor of cash injections just
weeks later? Will short sales be allowed?
And if so, for how long? Why was $125
billion in preferred equity earmarked for
eight selected banks (as opposed to seven
or nine)? Why $125 billion for all others?
Why were the Hopeless Three provided
access to TARP after Congress said no to
subsidies? No one knows—or is willing to
share—the answers to these questions.
The absence of a clearly articulated
economic policy may be understandable,
but it is not forgivable. This is an era in
which reporters were embedded with our
troops in Iraq, to assure that they “got the
message out” expeditiously. The absence of
a message in this case created widespread
financial and economic panic, with cas-
cading consequences.
T R U S T M A T T E R S
Without trust, any society will degenerate
into petty survivalism. One of the primary
functions of government is to codify basic
trust (prohibitions against theft, rape, and
murder) and to punish those (thieves,
rapists, and murderers) who violate socie-
tal trust. Basic financial trust revolves
around the belief that debts will be repaid,
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that entities seeking debt and equity are
truthful, and that governments will pun-
ish wrong-doers and not act capriciously.
It is reflective of the serial failure of polit-
ical leadership that from September 13 to
November 21, not only did the stock mar-
ket collapse and debt spreads substantially
widen, but the commercial paper market
all but ceased to function, and money
market funds teetered. LIBOR spreads
over the Fed Funds rate spiked 53 percent
(from 248 basis points the day before the
initial failed TARP vote to 380 basis
points on October 10); REITs fell by 76
percent; while AAA CMBS spreads rose
by 138 basis points, and the S&P 500 fell
by 25.9 percent. Only the strongest and
most transparent non-financial borrowers
have been able to overcome this wide-
spread lack of trust.
Like children playing the old game
“button, button, who has the button?,”
capital sources have hoarded cash as they
play “losses, losses, who has the losses?”
Real yields on 30-day Treasuries reached
-1.57 percent (Figure 9), underscoring the
fact that many savvy investors were happi-
er to experience guaranteed losses of mere-
ly 2 percent, rather than stumbling into
huge losses, and as of December 19, the
30-year Treasury yield was 2.6 percent.
What the U.S. economy needs is the
immediate and total disclosure of all assets
and liabilities (with no materiality, safe
harbor or off-balance sheet exceptions)
from any institution with access to any
form of state or federal guarantee. If you
owe the donut delivery kid $10, just tell us
and we’ll decide whether it is a material lia-
bility. And mark-to-market valuations
should be applied only to assets with active
markets (for example, a bid-ask spread of
less than 2 percent). A full disclosure
requirement could be implemented imme-
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Figure 9: Short-term spreads have sky-rocketed
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diately, and would allow investors to assess
who holds the losses, restoring basic finan-
cial trust. It would also quickly reveal
which financial institutions are insolvent,
allowing public and private liquidity infu-
sions to be given to only the living, while
an RTC-like agency set about the orderly
liquidation of the dead.
The losses of 2004 to 2007 have creat-
ed a mine field. But just as there are a finite
number of mines in a mine field, there are
a finite number of losses. The real question
is, who holds the losses? The strange thing
is that each time a loss-mine explodes
(Bear Stearns, Fannie/Freddie, AIG,
Lehman, Wachovia, Washington Mutual),
we become a bit safer, as there is one less
mine to be inadvertently stepped on (this
is true in spite of collateral damage to those
near the detonation). Yet psychologically
speaking, seeing firms blown to bits erodes
our confidence, makes us feel more endan-
gered, stops us dead in our tracks, and cre-
ates public panic.
What is required to get the economy
out of this minefield of losses? Leadership!
A great officer with troops stuck in a mine
field: does not panic; keeps the troops
from panicking; identifies the location of
the mines; and expeditiously clears a path
so that the troops may proceed forward.
Only after the troops are safely out of the
mine field does the officer worry about
how much is paid to the victims and who
is at fault for the troops marching into the
minefield. There will be finger-pointing,
but first the mines must be cleared away.
The mines the economy faces are the
future losses associated with poorly
underwritten investments made during
2004 through early 2007. The trouble is
that we do not know how big these loss-
es are, when they will occur, which firms
hold these assets, or if these losses will
wipe out their equity. Unfortunately, like
a young lieutenant fresh out of West
Point, our political leadership panicked
in the mine field. This panic quickly
spilled over to the troops on both Wall
Street and Main Street. And we still do
not know who holds the losses. Until the
location of the losses is revealed, the
economy and capital will largely stand
around in a worried state, rather than
moving forward.
This is going to be a recession rivaling
1973-1975, and it is going to take time to
work our way through it. Unfortunately,
the politically created panic coincided with
the Christmas retail season. People fell into
a post-9/11 mentality, where even if they
had money, they did not spend because it
seemed like the wrong thing to do. The
result was even more bad economic news.
T H E W A Y F O R W A R D
A large stimulus package is in the offing,
but the evidence on the efficacy of such
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packages is highly questionable at best.
At a theoretical level, government bor-
rowing and spending largely only
encourages the private sector to save
more to service future debt burdens,
reducing spending today. Moreover,
there may be substitution between public
and private spending. For example, if the
government decides to feed all school
children as a part of the stimulus pack-
age, private expenditures on children’s
lunches will fall dramatically, yielding lit-
tle net change in the economy. The argu-
ment for government spending as a stim-
ulus is most compelling for infrastruc-
ture programs, where little private sector
substitution occurs. However, if expendi-
tures degenerate into massive pork allo-
cation, there will be a social loss.
Contemporaneous descriptions of
past recessions are always characterized
by observations such as: “This is the
worst I can remember;” “It has never
been this bad;” “This one is different;”
“This one will last much longer than
previous ones;” “I don’t see any catalyst
to get us out of this one;” “There is no
sector to lead us out of it;” and “This
recession will fundamentally change the
economy.” Yet even as boardrooms, ana-
lyst reports, the media, and government
officials make such statements, a sus-
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Table III: Case-Shiller versus OFHEO home price indices through 3Q08
Atlanta (5.8) (9.5) (1.5) 2.4 (1.8) (2.3)
Boston (10.3) (5.7) (0.8) (8.9) (4.1) (2.7)
Charlotte, N.C. 7.9 (3.5) (2.3) 15.9 1.6 (1.7)
Chicago (9.4) (10.1) (1.5) 2.2 (3.8) (2.7)
Cleveland (10.5) (6.4) 0.2 (7.8) (5.7) (5.1)
Dallas (0.2) (2.7) (0.4) 8.7 2.6 0.0
Denver (4.8) (5.4) (0.5) (1.9) (1.0) (2.2)
Detroit (29.0) (18.6) (2.7) (21.9) (13.3) (6.8)
Las Vegas (36.1) (31.3) (7.5) (26.4) (26.8) (12.6)
Los Angeles (30.3) (27.6) (5.7) (13.5) (18.8) (6.6)
Miami (32.5) (28.4) (5.9) (4.4) (17.9) (8.2)
Minneapolis (17.5) (14.4) (0.7) (7.3) (6.5) (4.3)
New York (10.0) (7.3) (1.8) 1.5 (4.5) (3.2)
Phoenix (36.7) (31.9) (8.7) (11.9) (16.6) (7.5)
Portland, Oregon 3.5 (8.6) (3.1) 13.9 (2.6) (2.3)
San Diego (34.0) (26.3) (6.4) (23.3) (17.6) (6.1)
San Francisco (32.3) (29.5) (8.9) (6.8) (8.0) (2.6)
Seattle 5.3 (9.8) (3.1) 16.3 (3.0) (2.2)
Tampa (24.5) (18.5) (2.2) (10.5) (15.1) (4.6)
Washington (23.2) (17.2) (3.9) (9.5) (12.5) (4.7)
United States (19.8) (16.6) (3.5) 1.5 (4.0) (2.7)
Case-Shiller % change OFHEO % change
MSA YE 2005 to YE 2005 to
3Q08 1-Year 3rd Qtr 3Q08 1-Year 3rd Qtr
Source: Case-Shiller, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Linneman Associates.
tained recovery is generally only months
away. This time will be the same.
No modern recovery has had a “cata-
lyst” to turn things around. In each case,
sustained productivity growth, population
growth, and a return to fundamentals were
the routes to resumed economic growth.
And the growth was not driven by an
industry or sector, but rather by a broad-
based recovery, with isolated lagging sec-
tors. And rebounds, like downturns, hap-
pened far more rapidly than anyone pre-
dicted. This time will be the same.
Commercial mortgage-backed security
(CMBS) must return to its simple roots:
loan-to-value ratios of 50 percent to 60
percent; simple pass-through structures;
high debt coverage ratios; pools of assets
with similar risk characteristics (only
apartments, for example); and over-collat-
eralization. This simplified structuring
would restore transparency, and when fear
is rampant, transparency and simplicity
maximize value.
The best news for real estate is that new
construction financings were virtually
non-existent in late 2007 and 2008. This
will continue into 2009, meaning that
weakening demand fundamentals will
meet limited supply expansion, rather
than the exploding supply that usually
appears at the end of an economic cycle.
Housing prices are down year-over-year by
4 percent for the nation, based on the
OFHEO housing price index (Table III).
By mid-2009, the housing markets will
start to shift from an excess supply to the
very early stages of an excess demand.
The roughly $1 billion in global losses
by financial institutions are primarily asso-
ciated with loans that are fully current.
This means the losses are primarily conjec-
tural losses associated with current loans
(Figure 10). Are these staggering paper
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Figure 10: Mortgage delinquency rates are on the rise
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losses reflective of future cash flow losses, a
greater liquidity premium, an increased
risk premium, or sheer irrational panic?
Probably all of the above, but no one
knows for sure, as the actual losses will not
be known for many years. Each time
someone makes a payment on their mort-
gage, car loan, student loan, or credit card,
the maximum potential loss declines. Only
when every outstanding loan originated in
2004-2007 is either retired or settled via a
post-foreclosure sale will the actual losses
be tallied. This may take anywhere from
three to twenty-five years. Until then, esti-
mates of losses are a pure guessing game.
A poorly underwritten mortgage issued
in February 2005 to a greedy speculative
home flipper, at the behest of a snake-oil
salesman peddling a “can’t lose” proposi-
tion, with the assistance of a slimy sub-
prime broker, cannot be magically trans-
formed into a prudent loan. If instead of
disclosing the loss-mines and getting the
economy moving forward, we point fin-
gers, pass counter-productive legislation,
and raise taxes, our languishing economy
will create unnecessarily large future losses.
We all need to admit “I am guilty”
because: I did not argue forcefully
enough that the excesses were crazy; I
took some of that poorly underwritten
debt; I invested in money market funds
that bought anything rated AAA, irre-
spective of real asset quality; I financed
(or built) a home or condo using exces-
sively cheap debt; I invested in the stocks
of firms that carelessly used cheap short-
term debt to invest in highly leveraged
illiquid long-term assets; I elected politi-
cians who required Freddie/Fannie to
take ever greater risks; I put my money in
insured depositories without caring if
they were making sound loans with my
deposits. In short, this mess is my fault.
Having accepted guilt, we can focus on
identifying the location of the loss-mines
and providing capital transfusions (both
public and private) to the living, thus get-
ting the U.S. economy back on track
without creating unnecessary damage.
Even if the present value of the losses is
ultimately $1.2 trillion, the full reimburse-
ment of these losses via the proceeds of
long-term federal debt will cost us less than
$1.4 trillion (including financing costs),
versus aggregate U.S. GDP of roughly
$150 trillion to $170 trillion, and federal
spending of $30 trillion to $35 trillion,
over the next ten years. That is, for a mere
0.7 percent of our income over the next
ten years, we can reimburse the maximum
conceivable losses. It is only a few hours of
work a year by each of us, and less than a
couple percent of our net worth (spread
over ten years).
So please take the “I am guilty” pledge,
and urge our political leaders to cover the
losses as they occur out of our future
income. This is most easily be done by a
ten-year federal guarantee of all remaining
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interest and principal payments due on
every loan written from mid-2004
through mid-2007. After all, we are all
guilty, so we should all pay.
This loan guarantee program (subject
to a good faith requirement effort to col-
lect on loans and a fraud exception) will
spread the government cash flow burden
over time, as payments will occur only as
the loans default. This policy can be
implemented with minimal effort and
will instantly raise the value of loans by
converting most qualifying debt to gov-
ernment debt valuation, thus allowing
this debt to be sold efficiently as govern-
ment credit, creating cash proceeds for
new loans.
Everyone agrees that the financial sys-
tem was substantially over-leveraged and
that we need to de-lever. But no one with
debt wants to be impacted by this policy.
De-lever “them,” not “me.” But all de-
leveraging efforts must be concentrated
on the debt that requires rebalancing,
maturing loans, or new loans, as the
lender cannot generally reduce lending
on long-term debt. Hence, the de-lever-
aging of the system is 100 percent
focused on about 20 percent of all loans.
As a result, many wildly over-levered sit-
uations get a free pass, while new loans
are stonewalled by lenders.
But if lenders make new loans, they
will not achieve their leverage targets. It is
like going from a diet of 3,000 calories a
day to 900 calories a day: on such a diet,
even a lot of healthy food has to be forsak-
en. However, once we hit our target
weight, we can go to a 2,400-calorie diet.
This will occur once lenders reach their
target exposures.
The “de-lever them, not me” sentiment
is the schizophrenic element of the lender
bailout efforts. On the one hand, infusions
of government money are intended to
increase the asset base to more effectively
match current leverage. At the same time,
banks are being told to expand their lend-
ing. But the first task is to right-size lender
balance sheets. Lending will resume once
this objective is achieved.
A F I N A L T H O U G H T
Wemust resist the urge to save everyone—
Wall Street, Detroit, homebuilders, mort-
gage borrowers. Everyone has a “special”
case to make. We have Chapter 11 as a
limbo where companies can attempt to
reconstitute themselves. This protection
should be extended in a simple form to
consumers. But “special” bailouts do noth-
ing but redistribute income according to
political clout, undermining confidence in
economic outcomes, causing economic
activity to drop precipitously.
Losers must lose if winners are to pros-
per. If one or more of the Hopeless Three
goes bankrupt, their competitors’ sales will
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rise as consumers shift their purchases.The
increased sales realized by the competitors,
who make their vehicles in the U.S., will
improve their operating margins, allowing
them to avoid financial distress and
expand output and employment. As with
wildebeest in the Masai Mara, death is
essential to life.
Finally, people knew that leverage was
not without risk. They relished its upside,
and they now must suffer its downside.
The idea that a reasonably safe real estate
cash stream bought at a 4 percent to 5 per-
cent cap rate could generate a 20 percent
return is absurd unless premised on carry
trades and loads of ever-available debt. But
just as tenants do not always renew their
leases, lenders do not always roll their
loans. Debt is wonderful on the upside,
but remorseless on the downside. This les-
son will hopefully be remembered for a
new generation.
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